## March 9, 2000

IN RE: DOCKET NO. 1999-469-C – BELLSOUTH – GUIDELINES FOR ALTERNATIVE REGULATION.

Rebutal
COPY OF DIRECT TESTIMONY OF ALPHONSO J. VARNER FILED ON BEHALF OF BELLSOUTH HAS BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO:

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| 1  |    | BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.   |
| 2  |    | REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF ALPHONSO J. VARNER mm 2 y                                |
| 3  |    | BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF SOUTH CAROLINACE COMMIS                |
| 4  |    | DOCKET NO. 1999-469-C  |
| 5  |    | MARCH 7, 2000 MAR G 9 2000   |
| 6  |    | A E C E UTILITIES DEPARTMENT   |
| 7  | Q. | PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, YOUR POSITION WITH BELLSOUTH                           |
| 8  |    | TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. ("BELLSOUTH") AND YOUR                                |
| 9  |    | BUSINESS ADDRESS.  |
| 10 |    |  |
| 11 | A. | My name is Alphonso J. Varner. I am employed by BellSouth as Senior            |
| 12 |    | Director for State Regulatory for the nine-state BellSouth region. My business |
| 13 |    | address is 675 West Peachtree Street, Atlanta, Georgia 30375.                  |
| 14 |    |  |
| 15 | Q. | HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY FILED TESTIMONY IN THIS DOCKET?                            |
| 16 |    |  |
| 17 | A. | Yes. I filed direct testimony and one exhibit on February 15, 2000.            |
| 18 |    |  |
| 19 | Q. | WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?                                |
| 20 |    |  |
| 21 | A. | The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to respond to the testimonies of other |
| 22 |    | parties filed on February 29, 2000.  |
| 23 |    |  |
| 24 | Q. | DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS REGARDING THE TESTIMONY OF                            |
| 25 |    | MR. GREGORY TATE ON BEHALF OF AT&T?  |
|    |    | , NAL  |



| 2  | A. | Yes. First, nothing in Mr. Tate's testimony is responsive to the issues in this   |  |  |  |
|----|----|---|--|--|--|
| 3  |    | proceeding. This proceeding is designed to establish guidelines in accordance     |  |  |  |
| 4  |    | with the requirements of S.C. Code Section 58-9-576(B)(5). Mr. Tate's entire      |  |  |  |
| 5  |    | testimony involves the current prices for switched access in South Carolina.      |  |  |  |
| 6  |    | All existing prices in effect on the date BellSouth notified the Commission of    |  |  |  |
| 7  |    | its election of price regulation (July 14, 1999), including switched access       |  |  |  |
| 8  |    | prices, are considered just and reasonable. Mr. Tate has not identified any       |  |  |  |
| 9  |    | changes that occurred since July 1999 that would cause those rates to be          |  |  |  |
| 10 |    | unreasonable. Because Mr. Tate's testimony is not responsive to the issues in     |  |  |  |
| 11 |    | this proceeding, BellSouth has filed a Motion to Strike his testimony.            |  |  |  |
| 12 |    |   |  |  |  |
| 13 |    | Second, any complaint regarding the validity of prices is irrelevant to the issue |  |  |  |
| 14 |    | of establishing guidelines. Mr. Tate, at best, has the cart before the horse. The |  |  |  |
| 15 |    | guidelines must be established before he can claim that they are being violated.  |  |  |  |
| 16 |    | ·   |  |  |  |
| 17 | Q. | DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS REGARDING THE TESTIMONY OF                               |  |  |  |
| 18 |    | MCI's WITNESS MR. GREG DARNELL?   |  |  |  |
| 19 |    |   |  |  |  |
| 20 | A. | Yes. I have several comments rebutting the testimony of Mr. Darnell as            |  |  |  |
| 21 |    | described below.  |  |  |  |
| 22 |    |   |  |  |  |
| 23 | Q. | MR. DARNELL STATES THAT "THERE IS FUNCTIONALLY LITTLE IF                          |  |  |  |
| 24 |    | ANY COMPETITION IN THE LOCAL EXCHANGE MARKET IN SOUTH                             |  |  |  |
| 25 |    | CAROLINA" AND BELLSOUTH "HAS LITTLE IF ANY INCENTIVE TO                           |  |  |  |

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| 1  |    | OPEN ITS MARKET." DO YOU AGREE?   |
|----|----|---|
| 2  |    |   |
| 3  | A. | No. Contrary to Mr. Darnell's belief, there is competition in South Carolina    |
| 4  |    | and that competition is increasing rapidly on a daily basis. This is due to the |
| 5  |    | pro-competitive policies of this Commission and also due to BellSouth's         |
| 6  |    | opening the local exchange market in South Carolina to all competitors on a     |
| 7  |    | nondiscriminatory basis. This Commission has issued over 100 certificates to    |
| 8  |    | competitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs") to operate as local earriers in   |
| 9  |    | South Carolina and over 50 CLECs have filed tariffs in South Carolina. The      |
| 10 |    | growth of local service alternatives is on a steady rise as the following 1999  |
| 11 |    | over 1998 statistics attest:  |
| 12 |    | • 587% increase in provision of unbundled loops                                 |
| 13 |    | <ul> <li>146% increase in local interconnection trunks</li> </ul>               |
| 14 |    | • 1088% increase in ported numbers  |
| 15 |    | • 576% increase in collocation arrangements                                     |
| 16 |    | As the numbers demonstrate, customers in South Carolina not only have local     |
| 17 |    | service alternatives, they are indeed subscribing to these services.            |
| 18 |    |   |
| 19 |    | Mr. Darnell is also incorrect in his assertion that BellSouth has little if any |
| 20 |    | incentive to open its local markets. To the contrary, the Telecommunications    |
| 21 |    | Act of 1996 (the "Act") mandates that BellSouth open its local markets          |
| 22 |    | through interconnection, unbundled network elements and resale of its retail    |
| 23 |    | telecommunications services. BellSouth has done so. BellSouth also complies     |
| 24 |    | with the orders of the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") and this       |

Commission. In addition, BellSouth is determined to enter the interLATA

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| 1  |    | services market in South Carolina. In order to do so, BellSouth must                 |
|----|----|--|
| Ž  |    | demonstrate that it has opened its local markets and that it meets the               |
| 3  |    | requirements of the competitive checklist contained in the Telecommunications        |
| 4  |    | Act of 1996 (the "Act"). BellSouth needs no better incentive to open its             |
| 5  |    | markets.   |
| 6  |    |  |
| 7  | Q. | PLEASÉ COMMENT ON MR. DARNELL'S PURPORTED ATTEMPT TO                                 |
| 8  |    | "GIVE EFFECT TO THE LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF SECTION 576".                             |
| 9  |    |  |
| 10 | A. | Mr. Darnell attempts to address constitutional principles, statutory law and         |
| 11 |    | legislative intent over approximately eight pages of his testimony. It is not        |
| 12 |    | clear what he is proposing through his testimony. It appears that he is              |
| 13 |    | attempting to make some point about the relevance of existing law prior to the       |
| 14 |    | General Assembly passing Section 58-9-576, but the point is never really made        |
| 15 |    | clear. I am particularly intrigued by his suggestion that the General Assembly       |
| 16 |    | presupposed "that rates would have been long subject to some review, or that a       |
| 17 |    | <u>lawful</u> alternative regulation plan had been in effect, before the election of |
| 18 |    | alternative regulation is made." Had that been a concern of the General              |
| 19 |    | Assembly, it could easily have remedied the situation by adopting language           |
| 20 |    | addressing such a situation in Section 58-9-576. The General Assembly took           |
| 21 |    | no such action.  |
| 22 |    |  |
| 23 |    | Indeed, the statute governing BellSouth's election of price regulation is clear.     |
| 24 |    | Each clause under the statute is plain and there are no grounds for Mr.              |
| 25 |    | Darnell's interpretations. Because the statute is clear, legislative intent is       |

| 1          |    | clearly reflected by the plain language. Mr. Darnell's exercise in divining      |
|------------|----|--|
| 2          |    | legislative intent is merely an attempt to change the meaning of the statute by  |
| 3          |    | claiming ambiguity where none exists. Therefore, Mr. Darnell's dissertation or   |
| 4          |    | legislative intent is unnecessary and should be dismissed as irrelevant.         |
| 5          |    |  |
| 6          | Q. | HAS BELLSOUTH ATTEMPTED TO LIMIT THE REGULATORY                                  |
| 7          |    | AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSION AS MR. DARNELL SUGGESTS?                             |
| 8          |    |  |
| 9          | A. | No. In its proposed guidelines, BellSouth has merely attempted to put            |
| 10         |    | substance to the statute and the Commission's requirement that BellSouth draf    |
| 11         |    | proposed guidelines as specified under Section 58-9-576(B)(5). BellSouth         |
| 12         |    | believes it is useful for all parties to have the same understanding of how the  |
| 13         |    | terms of that section of the statute will apply. Mr. Darnell seems to imply that |
| 14         |    | BellSouth is attempting to undermine the Commission's authority. This is         |
| 15         |    | simply not the case. Again, the statute is clear and the flexibility provided    |
| 16         |    | BellSouth and other LECs by the statute and the Commission's authority to        |
| 17         |    | establish guidelines are clear. There is no attempt to undermine the             |
| 18         |    | Commission's authority.  |
| 19         |    |  |
| 20         | Q. | MR. DARNELL ACCUSES BELLSOUTH OF REWORDING SECTION 58-                           |
| 21         |    | 9-576(B)(4) OF THE STATUTE. PLEASE RESPOND.                                      |
| 22         |    |  |
| 2 <u>3</u> | A. | It is actually Mr. Darnell that is rewording the statute by ignoring its plain   |
| 24         |    | language and interpreting Section 58-9-576(B)(4) such that, after expiration of  |
| 25         |    | the cap period on Basic Services, the Commission, and not BellSouth, may         |

| 1  |    | adjust BellSouth's prices based on an inflation-based index. Mr. Darnell           |
|----|----|--|
| 2  |    | totally misses the point of price regulation. The intent of price regulation is to |
| 3  |    | establish the limits under which a LEC may adjust its own prices in order to       |
| 4  |    | meet market conditions. In this instance, the limitation on a LEC's pricing        |
| 5  |    | flexibility for Basic Services is that increases are subject to an inflation-based |
| 6  |    | index. The Commission will set the index and BellSouth may make price              |
| 7  |    | changes so long as those changes are within the limits allowed by the index. In    |
| 8  |    | this manner, a LEC is granted some flexibility to move its prices to meet          |
| 9  |    | market conditions.   |
| 10 |    |  |
| 11 | Q. | IS MR. DARNELL'S REFERENCE AT PAGE 13 TO BELLSOUTH'S                               |
| 12 |    | PROFITS APPROPRIATE IN TḤIŞ PROCEEDING?  |
| 13 |    |  |
| 14 | A. | No. By referring to BellSouth's profits, MCI is again attempting to litigate the   |
| 15 |    | issues in the recent earnings case. MCI is apparently attempting to improperly     |
| 16 |    | overlay rate-of-return regulation on the price regulation plan outlined in         |
| 17 |    | Section 58-9-576. Section 58-9-576(B)(2) states as follows:                        |
| 18 |    | On the date a LEC notifies the commission of its intent to elect the plan          |
| 19 |    | described in this section, existing rates, terms, and conditions for the           |
| 20 |    | services provided by the electing LEC contained in the then-existing               |
| 21 |    | tariffs and contracts are considered just and reasonable.                          |
| 22 |    |  |
| 23 |    | The statute contains no provision for a review of the existing rates at the time   |
| 24 |    | of the election, nor does the statute contemplate an earnings review at the time   |
| 25 |    | of election. Therefore, MCI's efforts to re-litigate the earnings case in this     |

| ,  |    | proceeding is improper.  |
|----|----|--|
| 2  |    | ·  |
| 3  | Q. | MR. DARNELL SUGGESTS THE COMMISSION ADOPT HIS                                    |
| 4  |    | GUIDELINES FOR BELLSOUTH, WHICH HE STATES ARE MODELED                            |
| 5  |    | AFŢEŖ THE SPRINT/UNITED GUIDELINES. DO YOU AGREE?                                |
| ·6 |    |  |
| 7  | A. | No. The guidelines proposed by Mr. Darnell are less definitive and less          |
| 8  |    | specific than those proposed by BellSouth. BellSouth's proposed guidelines       |
| 9  |    | provide definitive direction for a party to determine whether or not a proposed  |
| 10 |    | tariff meets the requirements of the statute. The Commission must act in the     |
| 11 |    | public interest as determined by the statute. Thus, a separate requirement to do |
| 12 |    | so is superfluous in the guidelines. What is useful is the additional procedural |
| 13 |    | direction that BellSouth's proposed guidelines provide.                          |
| 14 |    |  |
| 15 |    | Further, BellSouth has included an additional limitation on pricing flexibility  |
| 16 |    | that exceeds the requirements of the statute. BellSouth has placed a voluntary   |
| 17 |    | cap of 5% on the aggregate amount of annual increases it will make in the        |
| 18 |    | Other Services category. This voluntary limitation is supported by the Staff's   |
| 19 |    | witness, Mr. Gary Walsh, as evidenced on page 3 of his testimony. Further, at    |
| 20 |    | page 7 of his testimony, Mr. Buckalew, representing the Department of            |
| 21 |    | Consumer Affairs, also recognizes that BellSouth has voluntarily established     |
| 22 |    | this price limitation and finds the guidelines to be appropriate. Therefore,     |
| 23 |    | BellSouth believes it is unnecessary and inappropriate to adopt Mr. Darnell's    |
| 24 |    | proposed guidelines.   |
| 25 |    |  |

| ı  | Q. | ALTHOUGH MR. BUCKALEW AUREES THAT BELLSOUTH S                                     |
|----|----|---|
| 2  |    | GUIDELINES ARE APPROPRIATE, HE RECOMMENDS THAT                                    |
| 3  |    | INCREASES BE POSTPONED FOR EXISTING CUSTOMERS FOR 90                              |
| 4  |    | DAYS. DO YOU AGREE?   |
| 5  |    |   |
| 6  | A. | No. Section 58-9-576(B)(6) states that tariffs shall be presumed valid and        |
| 7  |    | become effective seven days after filing for price decreases and fourteen days    |
| 8  |    | after filing for price increases and new services. Mr. Buckalew makes no          |
| 9  |    | attempt to reconcile his recommendation with the language of the statute. The     |
| 10 |    | statute does not provide the Commission with the flexibility to extend the        |
| 11 |    | effective date of such tariffs. The statute recognizes that, as incumbent LECs    |
| 12 |    | are exposed to greater levels of competition for their products and services,     |
| 13 |    | they should be allowed the flexibility to respond more rapidly to changing        |
| 14 |    | market conditions. Therefore, the effective date for tariff changes and new       |
| 15 |    | services should follow explicitly the language of the statute.                    |
| 16 |    |   |
| 17 |    | Similarly, Mr. Russell, on behalf of TriVergent Communications, suggests that     |
| 18 |    | presumptive validity for tariff filings "does not automatically equate with       |
| 19 |    | effectiveness." Mr. Russell is incorrect. The statute clearly states that tariffs |
| 20 |    | shall be presumed valid and become effective in the time periods specified in     |
| 21 |    | the statute.  |
| 22 |    |   |
| 23 |    | If the concern of these parties is that customers may be billed for services that |
| 24 |    | are challenged and ultimately revised based upon a complaint, BellSouth's         |
| 25 |    | proposed guidelines ensure that such a situation will not occur. Article IV.12    |

| 7  |    | of BellSouth's proposed guidelines states:                                       |
|----|----|--|
| 2  |    | Should the Commission determine after investigation that a tariff filing         |
| 3  |    | is disapproved, the Commission shall have authority to require                   |
| 4  |    | adjustments to customer bills for any applicable price differential.             |
| 5  |    | Said adjustment shall be authorized from the date the tariff became              |
| 6  |    | effective through the date of its disapproval.                                   |
| 7  |    |  |
| 8  | Q. | PLEASE COMMENT ON MR. WALSH'S PROPOSAL TO USE THE                                |
| 9  |    | COMMISSION'S EXISTING COMPLAINT PROCEDURES TO HANDLE                             |
| 10 |    | COMPLAINTS UNDER SECTION 58-9-576(B)(5).   |
| 11 |    |  |
| 12 | A: | BellSouth set forth the complaint procedures in Article IV of its proposed       |
| 13 |    | guidelines in order to assist the Commission by limiting complaints to those     |
| 14 |    | with a valid basis under Section 858-9-576(B)(5). BellSouth understands that     |
| 15 |    | the Commission has limited resources and BellSouth intended that its proposed    |
| 16 |    | procedures enhance, not replace, the Commission's existing complaint process.    |
| 17 |    | The Commission's current complaint procedures deal with any type of              |
| 18 |    | complaint. BellSouth has outlined a process that it believes deals more          |
| 19 |    | definitively with the issues pertaining to price regulation and provides for the |
| 20 |    | speedy resolution of a complaint involving services under the Other Services     |
| 21 |    | category.  |
| 22 |    |  |
| 23 | Q. | MR. WALSH RECOMMENDS BELLSOUTH'S PRICES, OTHER THAN                              |
| 24 |    | BASIC SERVICE PRICES, BE EQUAL TO OR ABOVE BELLSOUTH'S                           |
| 25 |    | LONG RUN INCREMENTAL COST, WHILE MR. BUCKALEW                                    |

| •  |    | recommended from coordinates and the coordinates are considered and coordinates are considered as a considered and coordinates are considered as a considered |
|----|----|---|
| 2  |    | INCREMENTAL COSTS. PLEASE COMMENT.  |
| 3  |    |   |
| 4  | A. | Based on the testimony of these parties, BellSouth agrees that it will not price  |
| 5  |    | services in the Other Services category below its long run incremental cost to  |
| 6  |    | provide the service, subject to the following exception. On a case by case  |
| 7  |    | basis, BellSouth may, in good faith, price services to meet the equally low   |
| 8  |    | price of a competitor.  |
| 9  |    |   |
| 10 | Q. | MR. DARNELL SUGGESTS A FAR MORE EXPANSIVE TEST FOR  |
| 11 |    | DETERMINING THE LEGALITY OF THE PRICING OF OTHER  |
| 12 |    | SERVICES. PLEASE COMMENT.   |
| 13 |    |   |
| 14 | A. | At page 13 of his testimony, Mr. Darnell suggests that a complaint "could be as   |
| 15 |    | simple as a customer contending that BellSouth is charging its customers more   |
| 16 |    | than would be permitted by a competitive marketplace and as such BellSouth  |
| 17 |    | must be abusing its Market Position." First, the market for all services affected   |
| 18 |    | by the price regulation plan are open to competition. So a claim that prices  |
| 19 |    | exceed those allowed by a competitive marketplace is unsupportable. The   |
| 20 |    | result of his analysis is that, if BellSouth has prices that can be undercut by a   |
| 21 |    | competitor, then BellSouth is abusing its market position. That conclusion is   |
| 22 |    | illogical.  |
| 23 |    |   |
| 24 |    | Second, Mr. Darnell's standard for a complaint would subject BellSouth and  |
| 25 |    | this Commission to an unnecessary level of complaints not mandated by the   |

| 1  |    | statute. His standard would subject every pricing decision to challenge when   |  |  |  |  |
|----|----|--|--|--|--|--|
| 2  |    | the price of even a single competitor was found to be less than BellSouth's    |  |  |  |  |
| 3  |    | price. In fact, Mr. Darnell's comments suggest that when BellSouth prices a    |  |  |  |  |
| 4  |    | service above what a hypothetical competitor might charge, BellSouth's prices  |  |  |  |  |
| 5  |    | could be challenged on that ground alone. Such a standard would impose an      |  |  |  |  |
| 6  |    | unworkable morass of regulation and goes far beyond what the statute calls for |  |  |  |  |
| 7  |    | Mr. Darnell's suggestion should be dismissed.                                  |  |  |  |  |
| 8  |    |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9  | Q. | IS IT NECESSARY TO INCLUDE UNDER ARTICLE III OF THE                            |  |  |  |  |
| 1Ō |    | GUIDELINES THE PARAGRAPH SUGGESTED BY THE SOUTH                                |  |  |  |  |
| 11 |    | CAROLINA PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATES' WITNESS MR                          |  |  |  |  |
| 12 |    | WALTER RICE?   |  |  |  |  |
| 13 |    |  |  |  |  |  |
| 14 | A. | No. The paragraph suggested for inclusion by Mr. Rice is unnecessary. First,   |  |  |  |  |
| 15 |    | Section 58-9-576 does not contain any exclusion for Public Telephone Access    |  |  |  |  |
| 16 |    | Service ("PTAS") from the requirements of that section. Therefore, PTAS is     |  |  |  |  |
| 17 |    | appropriately subject to the statute and is also subject to guidelines to be   |  |  |  |  |
| 18 |    | adopted under Section 58-9-576(B)(5). Second, PTAS prices are subject to       |  |  |  |  |
| 19 |    | any applicable FCC requirements. The proposed guidelines do not modify the     |  |  |  |  |
| 20 |    | FCC's requirements.  |  |  |  |  |
| 21 |    |  |  |  |  |  |
| 22 | Q. | PLEASE COMMENT ON TRIVERGENT'S POSITION THAT THE                               |  |  |  |  |
| 23 |    | LEGISLATIVE FINDING THAT EXISTING RATES ARE JUST AND                           |  |  |  |  |
| 24 |    | REASONABLE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A FINDING THAT SUCH                             |  |  |  |  |
| 25 |    | RATES DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF MARKET POSITION.                           |  |  |  |  |

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| A. | TriVergent's position is illogical and assumes that the General Assembly         |
|----|--|
|    | reached a nonsensical conclusion. If the General Assembly believed that          |
|    | existing rates were allowing an abuse of market position, it clearly would have  |
|    | required such abuse to be corrected. A finding that the rates are just and       |
|    | reasonable directly contradicts any possible finding that the rates represent an |
|    | abuse of market position. TriVergent is suggesting that the General Assembly     |
|    | made two mutually exclusive findings in the same statute, which is simply not    |
|    | the case.  |
|    |  |
| Q. | PLEASE COMMENT ON TRIVERGENT'S CLAIM THAT THE                                    |
|    | COMMISSION COULD NEVER ADDRESS EXISTING RATES EVEN                               |
|    | THOUGH CIRCUMSTANCES CHANGE.   |
|    |  |
| A. | TriVergent's claim is incorrect. The General Assembly clearly stated that        |
|    | existing rates were just and reasonable upon BellSouth's election of price       |
|    | regulation. Consequently, there is no basis for reviewing existing rates at the  |
|    | time of election of price regulation. This does not mean that a specific rate is |
|    | forever insulated from review. It simply means a party must demonstrate that a   |
|    | specific rate that was just and reasonable is no longer just and reasonable. It  |
|    | does not permit a general review of rates.                                       |
|    |  |
|    | Q.   |

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For Other Services it appears that the only circumstance that could theoretically affect the viability of an existing rate under the statute would occur if the costs of providing that service changed significantly and BellSouth

| 1  |    | did not change the rate. Of course, if the rate changed, the new rates would be |
|----|----|---|
| 2  |    | subject to the guidelines. If the rate did not change and costs declined,       |
| 3  |    | competition would force adjustments in the rate and there would be no need for  |
| 4  |    | the Commission to address the existing rate.                                    |
| 5  |    |   |
| 6  |    | Thus, the only situation where TriVergent's concerns could theoretically apply  |
| 7  |    | would be where costs increased. Such costs would have to increase to the level  |
| 8  |    | where they exceeded the existing rate and BellSouth did not increase the        |
| 9  |    | existing rate. Such action would be illogical by BellSouth. However, we do      |
| 10 |    | not believe that a party is precluded from filing a complaint alleging this     |
| 11 |    | action.   |
| 12 |    |   |
| 13 | Q. | DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY.                                     |
| 14 |    |   |
| 15 | Ą. | Yes.  |
| 16 |    |   |
| 17 |    |   |
| 18 |    |   |
| 19 |    |   |
| 20 |    |   |
| 21 |    |   |
| 22 |    |   |
| 23 |    |   |
| 24 |    |   |
| 25 |    |   |

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF RICHLAND

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned, Nyla M. Laney, hereby certifies that she is employed by the Legal Department for BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. ("BellSouth") and that she has caused the Rebuttal Testimony of Alphonso J. Varner to be served by via hand delivery such in the care and custody of the United States Postal Service with first-class postage affixed thereto and addressed to the following this March 7, 2000:

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General Counsel
S. C. Public Service Commission
Post Office Box 11649
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